ASEAN Centrality and Its Prospects
The Association of Southeast Asian States has become world famous for the apparent effectiveness of the combined economic growth of its members and its seeming ability to speak and act with one voice.
UPDATE: As the summit season in Phnom Penh advances, the Long Mekong Daily brings you a series of articles from keen observers of South East Asian and East Asian politics. Today, José E. Mora, Professor and Global Affairs Chair, American University of Phnom Penh, writes about the future of ASEAN centrality.
The Association of Southeast Asian States has become world famous for the apparent effectiveness of the combined economic growth of its members and its seeming ability to speak and act with one voice. Part of its success has been attributed to the concept of the ASEAN Way and the impact it has on ASEAN Centrality, where these two have become intertwined and codependent. However, is the interrelatedness between them worth all the praise? Have they produced tangible value or is it more aspirational? This short piece will argue that despite its seeming success, ASEAN has been unable to achieve its highest aspirations nor overcome its most serious challenges because the ASEAN Way stands in the way of truly achieving of ASEAN Centrality.
When it formed in 1967, ASEAN was one of many south-south international organizations intent on diluting the bonds colonialism, when south-south relations were frequently affected by great powers or former colonial masters. It was seen as a way to diversify the network of relations beyond the former metropolis and deepen them through more frequent interactions. It became a way for new states to chart their own path, independent of the Cold War bipolar system. In Southeast Asia, during the Second Indochina War, where some states had bilateral security guarantees with the US, it was also seen as an additional defensive line against the perceived communist threat.
Alongside these concerns, the emerging states of Southeast Asia, felt rather politically weak. They needed to strengthen their domestic authority and legitimacy to feel internally secure. To do so, they needed to develop economically. However, to be able to dedicate resources to this endeavor, Southeast Asian states needed to also feel more secure with one-another. Today we take this for granted, but these states had been a threat to one another in the recent past. Thus, they created a policy of frequent engagement to deepen relations to feel more secure with one another. It provided a safe venue where undemocratic regimes could meet without judgement and without interfering with their respective national interests. They agreed to meet and discuss matters of common interest, primarily trade and development, and to not make any decision or statement unless all members agreed.
Over time, this method of engagement evolved into what became known as the ASEAN Way. This methodology focuses on consensus, respect of sovereignty, peaceful resolution of conflicts and non-interference, creating an atmosphere of informality, confidentiality, gradualism and non-confrontation. The combination of these principles makes ASEAN decision-making inefficient because it must dilute all actions to the ability or will of the lowest common denominator. However, the method has not been ineffective. In the economic realm, the process fostered the development and integration of the first six members, creating a regional dynamo. Perhaps we can attribute this success to the similar political and economic outlook of the first six members. However, what about the political-security realm? In this respect, the primacy of the national interest for each state and their dependence on extra-territorial powers for their physical security, have rendered action in this area unnecessary or unappealing. ASEAN had its first go at coordinating security policy during the Cambodian conflict (1979-91). During this period, ASEAN had the security assurance of the US and the political support of the PRC, the two most important powers for the region. Still, we can argue that the similarity in political and economic policies made most agreement possible without anyone having to worry about losing face.
These successes in the political and economic realm, and some encouragement from outside observers, led ASEAN to see itself as a hub for regional cooperation for East Asia. The convergence of consensus, non-alignment, and desire for peaceful coexistence led to the conception of ASEAN Centrality, the creation of the ASEAN Regional Forum (ARF) and other ASEAN+ arrangements. What had started with US’s tacit blessing and support in the Cold War, was now an institution of its own accord with an independent source of legitimacy. However, it had little authority. This would change with the creation of the permanent ASEAN Secretariat and the signing of the ASEAN Charter. Now, with free trade within ASEAN and the Secretariat, things would be different.
Unfortunately, outside of the economic realm, ASEAN has been unable to address its most meaningful challenges, primarily in the security realm. Why? Well, there seems to be an inherent tension between both ideas, ASEAN Centrality and the ASEAN Way. The centrality model is highly dependent on the ASEAN Way, which requires consensus and respect for the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC). However, the need for consensus prevents ASEAN from fulfilling its desire to act as an organization with meaningful voice and authority within ASEAN and weight outside. This inability to reach meaningful consensus on tangible political issues is a victim of the preeminence of the national interest among ASEAN member states (AMS). Secondly, the intra-ASEAN conflict resolution mechanisms have failed to resolve conflicts between AMS. Thirdly, the non-interference clause has also prevented ASEAN from resolving problems within AMS.
These challenges were not apparent when ASEAN Centrality was adopted. However, the accession of the CMLV countries (Cambodia, Myanmar, Laos and Vietnam) would make it evident. The level of development and agreement among the ASEAN 6 was significant, and thus consensus was not too cumbersome. On the other hand, the new less-developed members, were significantly different and had yet to develop a sense of community with the older members, with some of whom they still had some unresolved conflicts. The Preah Vihear conflict was the test of fire, where ASEAN failed to intervene effectively. This conflict would only be resolved through an extra-ASEAN institution. This was a lesson internalized by all, particularly Cambodia.
The Myanmar conflict is interesting because there is some merit to the claim that the ASEAN Way helped opening that society and bring in civilian rule. In this respect, quiet diplomacy did play a part. However, the recent return to military rule and ASEAN’s inability to intervene or affect conditions within Myanmar point to the weakness of ASEAN norms, making the institution’s claims ring hollow.
Lastly, ASEAN Centrality crumbles upon the challenge of a determined extraterritorial power. The South China Sea (SCS) controversy, the Scarborough Shoal and Mischief Reef show the inability of ASEAN to unify to face a determined challenger. The 2012 ASEAN Summit debacle, showed that the national interest of one AMS could hijack the ASEAN Way and undermine ASEAN’s claim to centrality. 2012 (and 2016) also shows the susceptibility of weaker AMS to PRC influence, weakening centrality even further. The weakness of the centrality claim is also present through the proliferation of mini-lateral arrangements, such as the Sulu Sea and the Malacca strait, where AMS went their separate way to address particular regional security problems. Lastly, the prolonged denial of membership to Timor-Leste can mostly be explained as the failure of consensus (although fear of increasing PRC influence within ASEAN also played a part).
Interestingly, none of these contradictions have been a challenge in the economic realm where there has been a significant agreement in the adoption of free trade measures. There, different benchmarks were agreed for different AMS based on their level of development. Furthermore, the ASEAN Minus X rule in Article 21 section 2 of the Charter ensures the continued progress in the economic realm despite disagreements between AMS.
To summarize, centrality as an idea is rhetorically supported by the AMS. However, the institutional apparatus leaves decision-making in the hands of the summit, where heads of state must balance consensus and the national interest, persistently undermining centrality through the ASEAN Way. This will continue to prevent ASEAN from strengthening its actorness in the international system, resulting in the absence of a coherent common foreign policy where ASEAN can truly become central. So, other than continued economic integration, the ASEAN Way will continue to prevent ASEAN from solving regional problems regionally.
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José E. Mora is Professor and Global Affairs Chair at the American University of Phnom Penh, Cambodia.
The views expressed are not necessarily those of The Long Mekong Daily