Better Late Than Never
Better Late Than Never
Australian state leader in China, Minilaterals in the Asia-Pacific, Media normalises "warmongering", Swiss bank myth fades, Energy transition $30 trillion, Saudi diplomacy diversifies,
UPDATE: Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews travels to China for a trade mission, his first since the state's Belt and Road agreements were torn up. It will make him the first Australian politician to visit China since the AUKUS submarine deal was inked amid rising security tensions.
While US-centred bilateralism and ASEAN-led multilateralism have largely dominated the post-Cold War regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, increasing doubts about their effectiveness have resulted in countries turning to alternative forms of cooperation, such as minilateral arrangements - The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN”.
Swiss National Bank monetary policy assessment made in an exceptional situation - ensuring price stability remains the core objective. Last week, there was a loss of confidence in Credit Suisse.
Early this month, the Daily Mail published a story online implying three Chinese men taking photos at the Avalon Airshow in Melbourne were spies. After complaints and an open letter condemning the paper for racially profiling the Chinese communities and throwing around baseless accusations, the story disappeared from the Mail’s site without explanation.
World Energy Transitions Outlook Preview warns of dramatic lack of progress, calls for strategic shift in the energy transition to sustain 1.5°C climate target. The global energy transition is off-track, aggravated by the effects of global crises.
The fact that Saudi Arabia entered a rapprochement deal with Iran and chose China to broker it came as a surprise to many international observers. The agreement, officially called the Joint Trilateral Statement, was signed in Beijing on March 11 and begins the process of restoring diplomatic ties between Riyadh and Tehran.
Australia’s Victorian Premier travels to China
Victorian Premier Daniel Andrews will travel to China this week for a trade mission, his first since the state's Belt and Road agreements were torn up. The premier confirmed he would travel to China, which is both the state and the nation's biggest trading partner, on Monday night. It will make him the first Australian politician to visit China since the AUKUS submarine deal was inked amid rising security tensions.
Mr Andrews said there would be a "very busy program of meetings" during the trip, which would take him to Beijing, Jiangsu Province and Chengdu from Tuesday to Saturday morning.
"It's a quick visit, but a really important opportunity for us to impress upon all of our partners in China … that Melbourne is open, Victoria's open, that the Chinese economy and Chinese community, business, our partners, are very, very important to us," he said.
The visit would be the first major public development in the relationship between Victoria and China since deals inked as part of China's Belt and Road Initiative (BRI) were torn up by the Commonwealth.
The federal government scrapped four deals between Victoria and foreign nations in 2021 under Commonwealth powers which had just been introduced. New federal cabinet minister Bill Shorten said the Commonwealth would always prioritise national security, "but I think it's a good development" that Victoria was engaging with China.
Mr Andrews said Prime Minister Anthony Albanese was "very supportive of our trip" and signalled other state premiers may make similar journeys this year. The premier said a focus of the trip would be growing the number of Chinese students studying in Victoria from the current number of about 42,000.
International students are one of Victoria's biggest economic drivers and the sector took a massive hit during pandemic lockdowns in both Australia and China. Victoria's debt is ballooning, with figures yesterday confirming that successive interest rate rises are putting even more pressure on the budget.
Victorian Liberal deputy leader David Southwick said that the opposition "absolutely support the intention of building relationships with China", but questioned why Mr Andrews was "being so secretive" about the trip.
Read full article here.
Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific:
The Quad, Lancang Mekong, ASEAN
While US-centred bilateralism and ASEAN-led multilateralism have largely dominated the post-Cold War regional security architecture in the Indo-Pacific, increasing doubts about their effectiveness have resulted in countries turning to alternative forms of cooperation, such as minilateral arrangements. Compared to multilateral groupings, minilateral platforms are smaller in size, as well as more exclusive, flexible and functional. In this video, Dr Bhubhindar Singh, Associate Professor and Head of Graduate Studies at RSIS, and Dr Sarah Teo, Research Fellow with the Regional Security Architecture Programme at RSIS, introduce their co-edited book “Minilateralism in the Indo-Pacific: The Quadrilateral Security Dialogue, Lancang-Mekong Cooperation Mechanism, and ASEAN”.
Watch the video here.
‘The media normalises war-mongering’: how Chinese Australians respond to talk of war in mainstream media
Early this month, the Daily Mail published a story online implying three Chinese men taking photos at the Avalon Airshow in Melbourne were spies. After complaints and an open letter condemning the paper for racially profiling the Chinese communities and throwing around baseless accusations, the story disappeared from the Mail’s site without explanation.
Then The Sydney Morning Herald’s Red Alert series hit people’s WeChat feeds, claiming a war with China could happen within three years.
The Daily Mail, like many other media outlets, possibly believed it could make insinuations of spying with impunity, since many of its intended readers would likely be sufficiently primed to accept such narratives as common sense.
In fact, a 2022 poll reveals: “Just over four in 10 Australians (42%) say ‘Australians of Chinese origin can be mobilised by the Chinese government to undermine Australia’s interests and social cohesion’.”
Commenting on the Mail’s “spy” story, La Trobe University’s Nick Bisley tweeted, “Yep, this is what happens when the red menace crap is thrown around carelessly”, apparently connecting it with the Red Alert series. Several foreign affairs specialists have called the series “pretentious”, “hyperbolic”, “irresponsible” and “implicitly racist” reporting.
Read full article here.
Remarks: Swiss National Bank Board
Ensuring price stability is and will remain the core objective of the SNB. Our monetary policy assessment has taken place in an exceptional situation. Last week, there was a loss of confidence in Credit Suisse. In order to avert damage to Switzerland, on Sunday the authorities decided on extensive measures to safeguard financial stability. The SNB contributed to this solution within the framework of its mandate. I would like to describe our contribution in more detail and explain why it was necessary.
The global crisis of confidence rapidly intensified last week due to the turmoil in the US banking industry. From Wednesday onwards, this had a direct impact on Credit Suisse’s liquidity situation as a result of strong outflows of customer deposits and cuts in counterparty limits. The SNB then lent Credit Suisse large amounts of liquidity in Swiss francs and foreign currencies. The extensive liquidity assistance provided the time needed to find a solution to safeguard financial stability. This solution had to be worked out under considerable time pressure in order to be ready before the Asian markets opened this week. A Credit Suisse bankruptcy would have had serious consequences for national and international financial stability and for the Swiss economy. Taking this risk would have been irresponsible.
On Sunday, the takeover of Credit Suisse by UBS was announced. At that time, we said that the SNB would provide additional substantial liquidity in the form of loans to support the successful implementation of the takeover.
The SNB provides such liquidity assistance within the scope of its statutory task to contribute to the stability of the financial system. In exceptional situations, as the lender of last resort we provide emergency liquidity against sufficient collateral. The solvency of the bank must be confirmed by FINMA in each case. Let me make one thing very clear: our liquidity measures are loans that are secured and subject to interest, and not gifts. The measures taken by the federal government, FINMA and the SNB have put a halt to the crisis surrounding Credit Suisse. In a few minutes, Martin Schlegel will explain the structure of the liquidity assistance loans in detail. Andréa Maechler will then talk about our cooperation with other central banks over the last few days. She will also briefly explain the impact of the liquidity measures on the implementation of our monetary policy.
Thomas Jordan, Chairman of the Governing Board, Martin Schlegel, Vice Chairman of the Governing Board, Andréa M. Maechler, Member of the Governing Board (Swiss National Bank, Zurich, 23 March 2023)
Download full transcript here.
Investment Needs of USD 35 Trillion by 2030 for Successful Energy Transition
World Energy Transitions Outlook Preview warns of dramatic lack of progress, calls for strategic shift in the energy transition to sustain 1.5°C climate target. The global energy transition is off-track, aggravated by the effects of global crises. Introduced by IRENA’s Director-General Francesco La Camera at the Berlin Energy Transition Dialogue (BETD) today, the World Energy Transitions Outlook 2023 Preview calls for a fundamental course correction in the energy transition.
A successful energy transition demands bold, transformative measures reflecting the urgency of the present situation. Investment and comprehensive policies across the globe and all sectors must grow renewables and instigate the structural changes required for the predominantly renewables-based energy transition.
The Preview shows that the scale and extent of change falls far short of the 1.5°C pathway. Progress has been made, notably in the power sector where renewables account for 40 percent of installed power generation globally, contributing to an unprecedented 83 per cent of global power additions in 2022.
But to keep 1.5°C alive, deployment levels must grow from some 3,000 gigawatt (GW) today to over 10,000 GW in 2030, an average of 1,000 GW annually. Deployment is also limited to certain parts of the world. China, the European Union and the United States accounted for two-thirds of all additions last year, leaving developing nations further behind.
IRENA’s Director-General Francesco La Camera said, “The stakes could not be higher. A profound and systemic transformation of the global energy system must occur in under 30 years, underscoring the need for a new approach to accelerate the energy transition. Pursuing fossil fuel and sectoral mitigation measures is necessary but insufficient to shift to an energy system fit for the dominance of renewables.”
“The emphasis must shift from supply to demand, towards overcoming the structural obstacles impeding progress. IRENA’s Preview outlines three priority pillars of the energy transition; the physical infrastructure, policy and regulatory enablers and well-skilled workforce, requiring significant investment and new ways of co-operation in which all actors can engage in the transition and play an optimal role.”
The Preview warns that a lack of progress further increases investment needs and calls for a systematic change in the volume and type of investments to prioritise the energy transition.
Although global investment in energy transition technologies reached a new record of USD 1.3 trillion in 2022, yearly investments must more than quadruple to over USD 5 trillion to stay on the 1.5°C pathway. By 2030, cumulative investments must amount to USD 44 trillion, with transition technologies representing 80 per cent of the total, or USD 35 trillion, prioritising efficiency, electrification, grid expansion and flexibility.
Any new investment decisions should be carefully assessed to simultaneously drive the transition and reduce the risk of stranded assets. Some 41 per cent of planned investment by 2050 remains targeted at fossil fuels. Around USD 1 trillion of planned annual fossil fuel investment by 2030 must be redirected towards transition technologies and infrastructure to keep the 1.5°C target within reach.
Furthermore, public sector intervention is required to channel investments towards countries in a more equitable way. In 2022, 85 per cent of global renewable energy investment benefitted less than 50 per cent of the world’s population. Africa accounted for only one percent of additional capacity in 2022. IRENA’s Global Landscape of Renewable Energy Finance 2023 confirms that regions home to about 120 developing and emerging markets continue to receive comparatively little investment.
La Camera said, “We must rewrite the way international co-operation works. Achieving the energy transition requires stronger international collaboration, including collective efforts to channel more funds to developing countries. A fundamental shift in the support to developing nations must put more focus on energy access and climate adaptation. Moving forward, multilateral financial institutions need to direct more funds, at better terms, towards energy transition projects and build the physical infrastructure that is needed to sustain the development of a new energy system.”
IRENA’s World Energy Transitions Outlook (WETO) provides an energy transition pathway in line with Paris Agreement goals, limiting global temperature rise to 1.5°C. The forthcoming 2023 edition will contribute to the first Global Stocktake concluding at COP28 in the United Arab Emirates and will propose effective ways to accelerate progress over the next five years towards 2030.
The full WETO report.
As longterm partnership with US fades, Saudi Arabia seeks to diversify its diplomacy – and recent deals with China, Iran and Russia fit this strategy
The fact that Saudi Arabia entered a rapprochement deal with Iran and chose China to broker it came as a surprise to many international observers. The agreement, officially called the Joint Trilateral Statement, was signed in Beijing on March 11 and begins the process of restoring diplomatic ties between Riyadh and Tehran. Those ties were severed in January 2016 after protesters stormed the Saudi Embassy in Iran in the aftermath of the execution of Nimr al-Nimr, a prominent Saudi Shiite cleric who had criticized Saudi treatment of its Shiite minority.
As an analyst of Saudi foreign policy, I’ve seen how the kingdom’s decision to engage in this way with Iran and China is part of a broader diversification of the kingdom’s international relationships that has unfolded over the past decade. To close observers of geopolitical trends in Saudi Arabia and other Gulf states, the China-brokered deal fits into a pattern.
From being firmly a part of the anti-communist camp during the Cold War and closely tied into U.S.-led regional security networks in the Persian Gulf, Saudi foreign policy is now taking a nonaligned stance that has become increasingly consequential for how Saudi Arabia pursues its interests.
Saudis question US partnership
The relationship between the U.S. and Saudi Arabia is often said to revolve around an oil-for-security dynamic in which the Saudis provide the former and the U.S. the latter.
In reality, ties have spanned a far wider spectrum than that and have been more complicated, with periods of high tension – stemming from events such as Saudi participation in the Arab oil embargo in 1973, or the involvement of Saudi citizensin the Sept. 11 terrorism attacks in 2001.
But since the Arab Spring protests in the early 2010s, U.S.-Saudi relations have frayed, both in Riyadh and in Washington. The perception among Gulf leaders that the Obama administration abandoned former Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak during the Egyptian revolution in 2011 left them deeply rattled. They feared that the U.S. could abandon them just as it had done Mubarak, a longtime partner of 30 years.
This was compounded by the Gulf states’ exclusion from U.S. negotiations with Iran, initially in secret bilateral talks in 2013 and subsequently as part of the P5+1 framework of the U.N. Security Council permanent members, plus Germany, which culminated in the Iran nuclear deal in 2015.
And then in 2019, a missile and drone attack on Saudi oil infrastructure temporarily knocked out half the kingdom’s production. The attacks were linked, but never formally attributed, to Iran. President Donald Trump responded by declaring it had been an attack on Saudi Arabia, not on the U.S., drawing a distinction between their interests. Trump’s remarks, and subsequent inaction, caused shockwaves in Riyadh and other Gulf capitals as leaders began to question U.S. credibility as a reliable regional partner.
Finally, in 2021, the chaotic nature of the U.S. withdrawal from Kabul, Afghanistan, served to reinforce deeply-rooted perceptions about U.S. disengagement from the Middle East, irrespective of the situation in reality.
Read full article here.