Proliferation
US says no Russia nuke use, US places offensive nukes on Russian border, failed assassination attempt or headline news event? Cambodia-China counter crime, naval gazing in the South China Sea
UPDATE: Russia is very unlikely to use its nuclear weapons, the top U.S. intelligence official said on Thursday. Despite continued escalation from Washington and the heavy casualties that US proxy Ukraine is enduring in its war on Russia.
Weapons experts examine a key motive for Russia’s special military operation in Ukraine; namely, offensive nuclear and non-nuclear missiles being emplaced on Russia’s border.
U.S. Ambassador in Warsaw, Georgette Mosbacher, suggested relocating U.S. nuclear weapons based in Germany to Poland. One hopes this was just a mistake by a political appointee unfamiliar with NATO nuclear weapons issues, not a reflection of official U.S. government thinking.
Russia blamed Ukraine for Tuesday night’s assassination attempt on President Putin after two drones attacked the Kremlin, but were disabled by the security services before they harmed anyone.
Putting security at the forefront, Cambodian Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Public Security of China on Saturday signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to increase bilateral cooperation to prevent cross-border crime, online fraud and illegal gambling.
One of the drivers that led Vietnam to conduct a military campaign against Cambodia was its sense of strategic vulnerability, sandwiched between China to the north and Cambodia to the south. Cambodia’s Ream naval base located on the southern tip of Cambodia has used Chinese funding to modernise and expand the base. But a base at Ream would not significantly improve the Chinese navy and air force’s ability to operate in the South China Sea.
Russia 'very unlikely' to use nuclear weapons, US intel chief
Edited
Russia is very unlikely to use its nuclear weapons, the top U.S. intelligence official said on Thursday. Despite continued saber-rattling from Washington and increasing deployment of US nuclear missiles in Europe and the Pacific.
"It's very unlikely, is our current assessment," Director of National Intelligence Avril Haines told the Senate Armed Services Committee.
Nuclear tensions between Russia and the United States have increased since the start of the conflict with Ukraine with Putin repeatedly warning that Russia is ready to use its nuclear arsenal if necessary to defend its "territorial integrity."
In February, Putin announced Russia was suspending its participation in the New START treaty, the last remaining nuclear arms pact with the United States, which limits the number of strategic warheads each side can deploy. U.S. officials for months have said they have not seen signs Russia was preparing to employ nuclear weapons but also cautioned that they were staying vigilant.
Last month, a top U.S. diplomat publicly said the United States and its NATO allies needed to remain alert for signs Russian President Vladimir Putin could use a tactical nuclear weapon in a "managed" escalation of his war in Ukraine.
Deputy U.S. Secretary of State Wendy Sherman pointed to Putin's March 25 announcement that Russia was preparing to station tactical nuclear weapons in neighboring Belarus "is his effort to use this threat in a managed way."
Still, there have also been assurances of nuclear restraint from Moscow. Last week the Kremlin played down the idea that Russia might be preparing to carry out a nuclear weapons test, saying all nuclear states were abiding by a moratorium on the testing of nuclear weapons.
Read more here.
If the Missile Fits, Beware!
Ray McGovern on ‘ABM’ sites in Romania & Poland
Preparing the talk, I drew heavily on the old-school discipline of media analysis. Then I wove in the experience of weapons experts in an attempt to examine what seems to have been one key motive for Russia’s invasion of Ukraine; namely, offensive missiles being emplaced on Russia’s border.
Background: After the US withdrew from the ABM Treaty, missile emplacements began to appear in Romania and Poland. THE PROBLEM: The Kremlin cannot be sure what missiles are now there, or will be there. To understate the problem, this is destabilizing.
A review of dealings between the U.S. and Russia, with particular focus on Dec. 2021 to Feb. 2022, suggests Russia saw an existential threat from (previously banned) nuclear-capable missiles on its periphery. Sixty years ago President John F. Kennedy faced a similar threat in Cuba. He responded
forcefully and Nikita Khrushchev, seeing no existential threat to Russia, backed down. And we got to live another day.
And here we are – still—for the nonce.
US nukes in Poland are a truly bad idea
On May 15, the U.S. Ambassador in Warsaw, Georgette Mosbacher, suggested relocating U.S. nuclear weapons based in Germany to Poland. One hopes this was just a mistake by a political appointee unfamiliar with NATO nuclear weapons issues, not a reflection of official U.S. government thinking. Moving nuclear weapons to Poland would prove very problematic.
The U.S. Air Force maintains 20 B61 nuclear gravity bombs at Buchel Air Base in Germany (as well as B61 bombs on the territory of four other NATO members). Kept under U.S. custody, the bombs could, with proper authorization in a conflict, be made available for delivery by German Tornado fighter-bombers. This is part of NATO’s “nuclear sharing” arrangements.
The Tornados are aging, and the German Ministry of Defense is considering purchasing F-18 aircraft to continue the German Air Force’s nuclear delivery capability. That has reopened debate within Germany about the presence of U.S. nuclear arms there, with Social Democratic Party (SPD) parliamentary leader Rolf Mützenich calling for their removal.
On May 14, U.S. Ambassador to Germany Richard Grenell wrote an op-edexpressing concern about not “eroding the solidarity that undergirds NATO’s nuclear deterrent” and calling for the SPD to affirm Germany’s commitment to nuclear sharing. The next day, Ambassador Mosbacher entered the fray, with a tweet suggesting that U.S. nuclear weapons could be relocated to and housed in Poland.
This is a truly bad idea.
First, moving U.S. nuclear weapons to Poland would be expensive. Relocation would require constructing special infrastructure, such as WS3 underground storage vaults, and other equipment to ensure their security. The vaults normally are located within specially hardened aircraft shelters. While not a budget-buster, U.S. and NATO militaries have far more pressing needs to shore up the alliance’s deterrence and defense posture.
Second, deploying the B61 bombs in Poland would make them more vulnerable to Russian preemptive attack in a crisis or conflict. Russia has deployed Iskandr-M ballistic missiles in Kaliningrad. With a range of up to 500 kilometers, these missiles could strike targets in almost all of Poland within a matter of minutes and with very little warning.
Buchel, by contrast, would have longer warning time of an attack, and aircraft flying from there at least begin their flights out of range of Russian air defenses. The two major Polish air bases — which host Polish F-16s that are not, in any case, nuclear capable — are located within range of Russian S400 anti-aircraft missiles deployed in Kaliningrad and their radars.
Third, placing nuclear weapons in Poland would be hugely provocative to Russia. This is not an argument against provoking Russia in general — given itsprovocative behavior, including a military build-up, bellicose rhetoric, and use of military force against Ukraine. (Indeed, I called in 2014 for Washington to provide lethal military assistance to Ukraine and for U.S. and NATO forces to deploy to the Baltic states, steps that Moscow deemed “provocative.”)
But there is provocative and there is provocative. Putting U.S. nuclear arms so close to Russia would be the latter. Recall the 1962 Cuban Missile Crisis, when the Soviet Union placed nuclear weapons 90 miles from American shores. President John F. Kennedy imposed a naval blockade, which allowed time to work out a settlement with Moscow. In doing so, however, he set aside the recommendation of many of his advisers for air strikes and a full-scale invasion of Cuba.
Fourth, a U.S. proposal to relocate its nuclear weapons to Poland would prove very divisive within NATO. The members of the alliance stated in 1997 that “they have no intention, no plan, and no reason to deploy nuclear weapons on the territory of new [NATO] members.” They incorporated that into the “Founding Act” that established relations between NATO and Russia.
The security circumstances in Europe have changed dramatically and, unfortunately, for the worse over the past 23 years. Despite that, many NATO members still support the “three no’s” regarding nuclear weapons that the alliance adopted in 1997. A U.S. proposal to move the bombs to Poland would divide allies, cause some to question U.S. judgment, and prompt a broader nuclear debate within the alliance at a time when NATO should strive to show a firm and united stance toward Russia.
Relocating U.S. nuclear weapons to Poland would be expensive, militarily unwise because it would make the weapons more vulnerable to preemptive attack, unduly provocative, and divisive within NATO. This was a tweet best not sent. The one thing it does do, however, is give Mr. Mützenich a new talking point for removing the bombs from Germany; citing Ambassador Mosbacher, he can claim: “We can send them to Poland.”
Read more here.
Debunking Kiev & Blinken's Latest Lie
Russia blamed Ukraine for Tuesday night’s attempted assassination of President Putin after two drones attacked the Kremlin but were disabled by the security services before they harmed anyone. Kiev rejected the accusation and lied that the incident was a false flag per the innuendo pushed by Zelensky’s spokesman Nikiforov and senior advisor Podolyak. US Secretary of State Blinken echoed their claims by advising to “take anything coming out of the Kremlin with a very large shaker of salt.”
The Kremlin’s predictably declared right to retaliate “anywhere and anytime it deems necessary” guaranteed that neither of those two would admit to any knowledge of the attack, but it wasn’t foreseen that they’d both collude in concocting a false flag conspiracy theory. Their credibility was already shattered after Russia failed to go bankrupt and subsequently collapse over the past year like they predicted, so it takes a lot of chutzpah to still lie about this attack in spite of their track record.
Russians are already very patriotic ahead of this practically sacred commemoration of their people’s victory over Nazi Germany so there’s no reason for the government to stage a false flag attack against President Putin for that purpose. As for Podolyak’s claim that “This would allow Russia to justify mass strikes on Ukrainian cities, civilians and infrastructure facilities”, that also doesn’t equate with objectively existing reality either.
Leaving aside his description of these strikes as “large-scale terrorist attack[s]” that he added at the end of his relevant statement, Moscow has already been striking military-relevant infrastructure for months without having to fake an attempted assassination of the country’s leader to justify this. Moreover, these precision strikes have been applauded by the population, many of whom believe that they’re still too low-scale for their liking.
The way that they see it, Russia’s so-called “red lines” keep getting crossed without Kiev being taught the relevant lessons to deter it from ever doing so again. Something worse seems to happen every time, but the cycle of bombastic rhetoric from the Kremlin, resultantly high hopes among Russian patriots, and their inevitable disappointment continues indefinitely and appears impossible to break. It’s little wonder then that some are cynical after the latest incident and worry that there won’t be a befitting response.
These sensitive observations about the true state of socio-political affairs in Russia nowadays are being shared not for the purpose of saber-rattling, but simply to point out that there’s literally no reason for the authorities to stage a false flag incident like Kiev and Blinken ridiculously implied. Many folks have wanted the scope of the special operation to expand for a while already and some have even gone as far as lobbying for their country to enter a formal state of war in order to fully mobilize all aspects of society.
These people had been warning for months that the authorities’ prioritization of political goals over military ones, which they believe is responsible for Russia not overwhelmingly responding every time its red lines were crossed, would inevitably embolden Kiev to go even further. No patriot is happy about what just happened, but quite a few are convinced that it might have been avoided had the Kremlin reacted much more muscularly to its opponent’s prior spree of provocations up until this one.
Returning to the false flag conspiracy theory that Kiev and Blinken are propagating by innuendo, there’s no credible reason to believe this blatant lie. Considering that few are expected to fall for this fake news, it can therefore be interpreted as them provoking the Kremlin by way of mockery since nobody in their right mind would ever believe this. They both seem convinced that Russia won’t overwhelmingly or at least reciprocally respond to this assassination attempt, but patriots hope that it’ll finally surprise them.
Read more here.
Cambodia, China sign new MoU to prevent cross-border crimes
Putting security at the forefront, Cambodian Interior Ministry and the Ministry of Public Security of China on Saturday signed a memorandum of understanding (MoU) to increase bilateral cooperation to prevent cross-border crime, online fraud and illegal gambling.
Interior Minister Sar Kheng said yesterday on his Facebook page that the ministries of both nations signed the new MoU to implement cooperation on key issues, especially to curb attempts to create a colour revolution movement, to stop illegal gambling and to prevent all kinds of transnational crime.
“In addition, both sides will continue to work closely to support each other towards building and training human resources in the field of law enforcement and technical support in both bilateral and regional frameworks,” he said.
Kheng had made the remarks on Saturday while co-chairing a review meeting outlining the results of cooperation on questions of transnational law and order during his visit to Beijing.
The MoU between Cambodia and China was signed by Kheng and Chinese State Councillor and Minister of Public Security, Wang Xiaohong.
Kheng noted that both China and Cambodia share the same political commitment to maintain security, public order and social security.
“This type of cooperation contributes positive growth to the process of socio-economic development, especially in the aftermath of the COVID-19 crisis,” he said.
Kheng and Wang took time to praise the progress of close relations and cooperation between law enforcement agencies of both countries.
China and Cambodia are committed to work together closely to research, investigate and crack down on cross-border crimes of all kinds. They aim for progress, particularly on immigration crimes, human trafficking, and telecom fraud.
During his visit to China, Kheng also travelled to Tianjin to meet with Zhang Kong, governor of the city. Their discussions involved understanding the development of Tianjin, especially with regard to sharing the potential of its unique geographical, cultural and economic situation.
He highlighted the fruitful relations and cooperation in the fields of investment, seaport and security between Tianjin and some provinces of Cambodia.
The Chinese State Council also released a statement on Saturday detailing the meeting between Wang and Kheng, highlighting the review of achievements during the past ‘Year of Law Enforcement Cooperation activities between China and Cambodia’.
Wang said that the both sides will advise and guide each other based on the important consensus reached by both nation’s leaders.
He added that Cambodia has made remarkable achievements and accumulated valuable experience through mutual exchanges and dialogues.
Wang said China wants to work faithfully with Cambodia to implement important agreements, with a general aim to deepen cooperation on all issues of political and transnational security.
“China is strengthening cooperation in its capacity for law enforcement to share benefits for both our peoples, and so contribute our utmost to build a positive China-Cambodia relationship with a shared future in the new era,” he said.
Read more here.
Naval Gazing
In June 2022, several media reports announced that China was opening a military base at Cambodia’s Ream naval base located on the southern tip of Cambodia close to the waters of the South China Sea. Cambodia has already used Chinese funding to modernise and expand the Ream naval base. The reports claimed that a secret deal had been signed between Cambodia and China, giving the Chinese People’s Liberation Army Navy (PLAN) exclusive access to part of Ream.
Both Cambodia and China denied such reports. Cambodian Defence Minister Tea Banh said that the country’s constitution strictly forbade hosting foreign troops in its territory. Time will tell whether China will establish such a base in Cambodia.
While the United States has not elaborated on the threat that a Chinese naval base at Ream may pose, most analysts argue that it would increase the PLAN’s ability to operate in the waters of the South China Sea. But a base at Ream would not significantly improve the Chinese navy and air force’s ability to operate in the South China Sea. For Chinese navy vessels operating from Hainan and southern China, a base at Ream is even less important. China has built at least 20 artificial islands in the South China Sea — many of them with infrastructure far more sophisticated than the Ream base.
But while Ream is not vital for Chinese power in the South China Sea, it has strategic importance for Vietnam. Vietnam’s east coast faces the Chinese island of Hainan where the PLAN’s south fleet is based. China could blockade the east coast of Vietnam quickly, including its main naval base at Cam Ranh Bay.
Because Cambodia shares both land and sea borders with Vietnam, a Chinese naval presence in Ream — less than 150 kilometres from the Vietnamese southern coast — would be useful to China. In a conflict over the South China Sea, the Vietnamese navy and air force would be no match for the Chinese.
Vietnam has been trying for decades to contain Chinese influence in Cambodia and Laos. But China’s overwhelming economic power has made these efforts difficult. In the north, Vietnam shares a land border with China and in the west, with Laos and Cambodia. Laos and Cambodia are highly dependent on China for trade and investment and have become close diplomatic allies of Beijing.
Cambodia’s growing defence relations with China have affected Vietnam’s strategic calculus. Since Cambodia’s defence relations with the United States went awry in 2010, China has stepped in to fill the void. In that same year, Beijing supplied trucks and uniforms to Cambodia.
In recent years, China has also assisted Cambodia in developing its naval capabilities. Improvements in Cambodian naval and air defence and surveillance capabilities around Ream Naval Base should not come as a surprise. Cambodian officials have previously pointed out the navy’s lack of communication and surveillance capabilities and the need to enhance the country’s air defence.
Developing the new defence facilities in Ream National Park would not involve Chinese presence or funding. Still, Vietnam is worried about a lack of transparency regarding Cambodia’s current construction activities at Ream Naval Base, worsened by the potential development of air defence facilities in the nearby national park.
According to the same Vietnamese official, Cambodia does not share details on the ongoing construction at Ream Naval Base with Vietnam, despite the countries having good relations. The official Cambodian government stance is that it would not allow any foreign military base to operate within Cambodia.
The debates surrounding China’s use of Ream Naval Base and nearby air defence facilities remain speculative. Once all the construction works are completed, a clearer picture will develop. Until then, Vietnam will continue to monitor the growing Cambodia–China defence relationship with wariness.