Downsizing

Biden team rejected China "end state", France de/re-industrialising, French soldiers leave Niger and first Russian officials arrive, strategic tremors in India-USA geopolitical paradise.

Dec 19, 2023

UPDATE: A primary reason the Biden team has rejected end states appears to be that no single end state is simultaneously realistic and acceptable to two key audiences: the US public and policymakers in ally and partner countries. Administration leaders insist “neither collapse nor condominium are tenable end-states” and note that each suffers from fatal flaws.

The French government has set itself the goal of reindustrialising France, starting from a situation where the manufacturing industry in the nation now represents just 10% of added value and 9% of total employment. The October 24 law on green industry supports the creation of an industry related to the energy transition (electric batteries, heat pumps, electrolysers for the production of green hydrogen, carbon capture and storage, etc.), with the aim of decarbonising French manufacturing.

As the last remaining French soldiers leave Niger, the first Russian officials are already being welcomed by Abdourahamane Tiani's junta. On Monday, December 4, the general who came to power in a coup four months ago received the Russian deputy defense minister, Colonel General Yunus-bek Yevkurov, with full honours in an unprecedented visit by a Russian official.

There has been serious trouble brewing in the geopolitical paradise of the convenient but strategic alignment between India and the US. According to Indian media citing government sources, US President Joe Biden would not travel to India for the Republic Day parade in January. This diplomatic snub, aimed at Indian Prime Minister Narendra Modi and India as a whole, is indicative of a significant shift in US-India relations, and the consequences could be far-reaching.

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USA End Game on China

Washington Wants Change, But It Can Come in Stages

Stage II

The Impracticality of a Unifying Objective

A primary reason the Biden team has rejected end states appears to be that no single end state is simultaneously realistic and acceptable to two key audiences: the American public and policymakers in ally and partner countries. Administration leaders insist “neither collapse nor condominium are tenable end-states” and note that each suffers from fatal flaws.

The goal of bringing about the collapse of the Communist Party has some notable champions. When he was Secretary of State, Mike Pompeo suggestedthat “we, the freedom-loving nations of the world, must induce China to change.” Others have insisted that Washington should aim for Xi Jinping to be “replaced by a more moderate party leadership” and for the Chinese people to “challenge the Communist Party’s century-long proposition that China’s ancient civilization is forever destined to an authoritarian future.” Many Americans are tempted by these arguments. After all, the United States brought about its opponents’ downfall in two World Wars and then waited out the Soviet Union during the Cold War. Why should the United States not do so again?

Explicitly attempting to bring about the end of the Communist Party, however, poses numerous problems. Washington has few levers to alter China’s domestic governance model. Worse still, making such an objective explicit could actually strengthen the Communist Party’s hold on power. And a public U.S. goal of forcible regime change would be opposed by most, if not all, U.S. allies and partners. Finally, attempting to remove the Communist Party from power would usher in a zero-sum struggle, which could lead to a heightened risk of conflict. For all these reasons, the Trump White House asserted that its approach was “not premised on an attempt to change the PRC’s domestic governance model.” The Biden team has done the same, with Jake Sullivan noting the U.S. goal “is not to bring about some fundamental transformation of China itself.”

The other end state rejected by the Biden team is creation of what they have called a great power condominium—essentially, an agreement by Beijing and Washington to share global leadership. The basic logic of those who favor such a condominium is analogous to the common understanding of the “responsible stakeholder” concept promoted by Robert Zoellick almost 20 years ago when he was Deputy Secretary of State. He suggested efforts “to encourage China to become a responsible stakeholder in the international system. . . [to] work with us to sustain the international system that has enabled its success.” Along similar lines, Michael Swaine, Jessica Lee, and Rachel Esplin Odell have more recently advocated “ultimately integrating Beijing into inclusive economic and cooperative security mechanisms.”

Unfortunately, this end state is hard to imagine today. Julia Bowie has describedthe responsible stakeholder theory as resting on “the expectation that China would become a status quo power.” Indeed, Zoellick had asserted, “China does not believe that its future depends on overturning the fundamental order of the international system.” But now even the European Commission has publicly described China as a “systemic rival promoting alternative models of governance.” Beijing’s coercive actions against Japan, India, South Korea, the Philippines, Australia, Lithuania, Canada, Norway, and others have driven a global reassessment of China’s behavior. Over 70 percent of respondents in a July Pew poll said that China does not contribute to peace and stability nor take into account the interests of countries like theirs. As a result, it is difficult to imagine a successful effort at engagement without some fundamental changes occurring in Beijing. The “era of engagement” appears to be over, at least for now.

So neither collapse nor condominium appears to be a practical end state around which to build consensus. They have something else in common: neither seems possible under Xi Jinping. Another concerted American attempt at engagementappears unlikely to shift Xi’s worldview, including his assessment that “Western countries led by the United States have implemented all-around containment, encirclement and suppression of China.” Even if American leaders could change Xi’s views of the bilateral relationship, there is no political appetite on either side of the aisle in Washington to test this proposition. U.S. officials from both parties appear to concur with Orville Schell, who has argued that it was “Xi’s aggressiveness that put a stake through the heart of ‘engagement’ as a viable US or Western policy.”

To say that engagement is now implausible as a strategy is not to imply that diplomatic meetings with Chinese leaders are unwise. The Communist Party is so opaque that American leaders are likely to learn more from their Chinese counterparts than vice versa. Yet, the objective of this diplomacy must change, even if its value remains. Leaders in Beijing and Washington now describe their aims in bilateral dialogues not as seeking to “improve” the relationship but rather to “stabilize” it. This is a much more limited objective predicated on continued competition, rather than an outright improvement in the relationship. In short, few on either side expect that these engagements will lead to any major change in behavior.

The Need for Phased Objectives

If end states are unattainable in the near-term and steady states are unsatisfying in the long-term, does that doom efforts to embrace a well-defined objective for America’s strategy on China? No. There is a third way: a phased approach. The United States could endeavor to maintain a stable steady state in the near-term while awaiting more fundamental change in China in the long-term. Doing so does not require American leaders to choose either collapse or condominium, but rather leaves the door open for either, depending on the choices of the Chinese people. If the United States is going to articulate an end state, this phased approach is the only approach likely to win support in both Washington and key allied capitals.

In the short-term, the Biden administration is right that America’s aim should be to establish a more durable steady state. Many of the administration’s actions have put the United States on a sounder path, particularly efforts to bolster cooperation with U.S. allies and partners while investing in the sources of American strength. Central to these initiatives will be reinforcing deterrence through adjustments to U.S. and allied military capabilities, posture, and planning. Unfortunately, efforts to make measurable progress with China on crisis management mechanisms have been slow going. Nonetheless, the Biden administration is right to try—and be seen trying—to push China to reduce the risk of conflict.

In the long-term, the United States should be clear that it is awaiting substantial changes in China’s behavior or governance. This is not a strategy of forceful regime change, but rather patience until the Chinese people themselves bring about a fundamental transformation in Beijing. Until then, the best Washington can hope for is to manage a risky competition and hope it does not spiral out of control. The Xi Jinping era will continue to be difficult and dangerous, so ultimately the American public and friends abroad should want a more durable end state. If this “patient but firm” approach sounds familiar, it is for good reason—it echoes U.S. strategy in the Cold War. Just as George Kennan foresaw the “break-up or the gradual mellowing of Soviet power,” Washington should hope for the mellowing or break-up of Chinese power. Then as now, waiting for regime failure should not be equated with forcible regime change.

Raising parallels with American strategy in the Cold War is not to suggest that the challenges posed by Beijing today are the same as Moscow’s decades ago. China bears little resemblance to the Soviet Union. Beijing boasts a far larger and more globally integrated economy than Moscow ever had. Yet, the Chinese Communist Party’s governance model is less attractive internationally than the Soviet system was in the early Cold War. Beijing’s political appeal lags far beyond that of the Soviets, who benefited from the communist bloc of aligned sympathizers worldwide. To date, Xi Jinping has also been less willing to use force at scale abroad than Soviet leaders, although U.S. policymakers must be wary because Beijing’s behavior could change over time. Thus, China is far more economically engaged abroad than the Soviet Union was, but is also less threatening ideologically. Containment is therefore inapplicable; Washington should not challenge Beijing abroad in the same way that it confronted Soviet influence globally, particularly given China’s current economic headwinds.

It is ironic that American strategists have spent much of the last few years playing the “Kennan sweepstakes” by trying to develop a phrase akin to containment that might guide American strategy. A better strategy is simply to adopt Kennan’s own phased approach: patience and firmness today while awaiting the mellowing or break-up of the Communist Party tomorrow. This is no panacea. It will have critics in Washington, Beijing, and beyond. But combining these two concepts is not as radical as it might seem. Indeed, Robert Zoellick ended his responsible stakeholder speech by insisting that “We can cooperate with the emerging China of today, even as we work for the democratic China of tomorrow.”

The Biden team has done an able job executing the first phase of an enduring American strategy on China. In fact, the early portion of the phased strategy recommended here might look almost identical to the Biden administration’s approach. Where a two-phased strategy would differ is in the long term. The indefinite maintenance of an inherently risky and increasingly tense competition should not be the ultimate objective of American strategy. As the time nears to hand off the baton to a second Biden administration or a new Republican team, U.S. leaders should be discussing end states. Effective strategies require clear objectives, so it is time to go back to the future and embrace a phased approach.

Reindustrialising France will not be easy

By Patrick Artus (Le Monde)

In his column, the economist outlines the six obstacles the government will have to overcome if it is to achieve the industrialization objective it has set for itself.

The French government has set itself the goal of reindustrializing France, starting from a situation where the manufacturing industry in the nation now represents just 10% of added value and 9% of total employment. The October 24 law on green industry supports the creation of an industry related to the energy transition (electric batteries, heat pumps, electrolyzers for the production of green hydrogen, carbon capture and storage, etc.), with the aim of decarbonizing French manufacturing.

This law reduces the time needed to set up industrial plants and clean up industrial sites, creates a tax credit for investment in green industries, redirects public procurement towards environmentally friendly companies and develops training for engineers and technicians. Unfortunately, there is reason to fear that France's reindustrialization will remain limited, given the many factors that penalize it.

Admittedly, industrial employment has risen by 62,000 employees since 2017, but this is primarily the consequence of the decline in industrial productivity, not a recovery in industrial activity: value added in manufacturing is now almost 10% below its mid-2019 level, and at the same level it was in 2006. The trade balance deficit for manufacturing products reached almost €100 billion in 2022, and it is steadily worsening. The last year it was balanced was in 2006.

Catch-up costs

The first obstacle to a genuine reindustrialization of France is the high cost of production. For example, relocating industrial production from China means doubling the cost of production; the price of natural gas is four times higher in France than in the United States. Hourly labor costs are 18% higher in France than the EU average, 11% higher than in the UK, three times higher than in Poland, Slovakia or Hungary, and five times higher than in Romania. Relocating or developing manufacturing in a country with high production costs is obviously difficult.

The second obstacle is that France has no natural supplies of industrial raw materials (rare-earth elements, copper, nickel, iron...). This puts us at a disadvantage compared with countries that do (China, Brazil, Russia, Canada, India, Indonesia, etc.), and makes us dependent in the event of a conflict over the appropriation of raw material reserves.

The third obstacle is the weakness of the industries needed for the energy transition or the decarbonization of industry. Wind turbine production is dominated by Denmark, China, Spain, Germany and the US; electric battery production is predominantly in China, South Korea and Japan; solar panel production is dominated by China, Taiwan, Japan and Germany; semiconductor production is dominated by Japan, Taiwan and the US.

Niger chooses Russia over Europe

by Morgane Le Cam (Le Monde)

The junta in Niamey denounced security cooperation agreements with Europe and received a Russian official with great fanfare, imitating the military rulers of Mali and Burkina Faso.

As the last remaining French soldiers leave Niger, the first Russian officials are already being welcomed by Abdourahamane Tiani's junta. On Monday, December 4, the general who came to power in a coup four months ago received the Russian deputy defense minister, Colonel General Yunus-bek Yevkurov, with full honors in an unprecedented visit by a Russian official.

Just like the juntas in Mali and Burkina Faso, Niger's new masters have announced the "strengthening of defense cooperation" with Moscow. Although a protocol agreement has been signed, its content remains top secret according to a government adviser. Yevkurov also met with the defense minister, General Salifou Mody, who is seen as the junta's number two.

At the same time, Niger has broken ties with one of its most important Western partners. In a note sent to the European Union delegation in Niamey on Monday, it denounced the two agreements governing European support for Niger's defense and security forces. Eucap Sahel, the 130-strong civilian mission set up in 2012 to support the country's border security forces, and EUMPM, the military mission installed there in 2022 to help Nigerien soldiers fight terrorism, have been asked to pack up.

Another divorce

At the end of November, the Nigerien authorities put an end to one of the main pillars of European cooperation in Africa by repealing a law that penalized the illegal trafficking of migrants. "It was the EU itself that suspended its security cooperation with us after the coup. As they no longer want us, neither do we want them" the official quoted above said, "our alliances with the West have prevailed since colonization and have not brought us good fortune. We need to get rid of them and move closer to other countries."

The break with Europe represents another divorce after that with France, the ally of overthrown president Mohamed Bazoum, who is still being held by the ruling military. In August, the junta demanded the dismissal of French ambassador, Sylvain Itté and the withdrawal of the 1,500 French soldiers. In addition, on Tuesday, Niger, along with Mali, denounced the agreements signed in the 1960s and 1970s with Paris to exempt French individuals and companies based in these Sahelian countries from being taxed twice.

Faced with sanctions and admonitions directed at Europe, the contingent of 1,100 US troops in Niger is keeping a low profile in an attempt to maintain its foothold. On the eve of the Russian delegation's arrival in Niamey, US Ambassador Kathleen FitzGibbon, in the country since mid-August, presented the junta with her letters of credence, a further step towards formalising her appointment.

Russia is nevertheless emerging as the new preferred partner. A power that did not colonize Africa and that trained many of the continent's soldiers after independence, Russia also offers lethal weapons without demanding human rights accountability in return. It is also providing planes, helicopters, weapons, and mercenaries from its private security group Wagner to Mali as well as enhanced security cooperation to Burkina Faso (notably through the training of military personnel), where it also pledges to build a civilian nuclear power plant and provide healthcare assistance. The offer is seductive for the juntas in Mali, Burkina Faso and now Niger, all three of which came to power promising to defeat the jihadist groups that have continued to plague their territory despite Western military support.

Alliance of Sahel States

Despite their differences, the three countries have chosen to strengthen their alliance. After Bamako a year ago, Niamey and Ouagadougou announced on December 1 their decision to leave the G5 Sahel group, a framework for political and military cooperation with Chad and Mauritania created with France's approval in 2014 to fight jihadist groups, on the grounds that the alliance served foreign interests. The countries created the Alliance of Sahel States (AES) in September in the face of the threat of military intervention by other West African countries to dislodge the junta in Niger.

The new bloc is the focus of most of Moscow's diplomatic efforts on the continent in recent months. According to Flightradar24, a website specializing in air traffic monitoring, before landing in Niamey on December 3, the Russian military aircraft carrying General Yevkurov's official delegation made stopovers in Bamako and Ouagadougou. The Russian deputy defense minister had already paid a first visit to Burkina Faso in September and October.

While the Burkinabe junta led by Captain Ibrahim Traoré, who was guest of honor at the last Russia-Africa summit in St. Petersburg at the end of July, has not communicated on Yevkurov's latest stay, the government of Colonel Assimi Goïta in Mali detailed its outlines on December 2. In Bamako, "important decisions were taken," the president's office noted on its Facebook page, referring to "the dispatch [...] in the next two weeks [...] of Russian experts in various sectors [energy, transport, telecommunications, mining]." The president's office also stressed Moscow's "satisfaction with the creation of the AES, which it sees as an ideal framework for cooperation between the Russian Federation and the Sahel states." At the end of a meeting of their three heads of diplomacy in Bamako between November 30 and December 1, the three countries expressed that their ambition for the Alliance of Sahel States was "to eventually achieve a federation."

Biden snubs India, again!

by S.L. Kanthan

To understand the bigger picture, recent events must be analyzed as the culmination of numerous unfriendly American actions toward India. These are startling, given the deep economic links and the "shared democratic values."

Theoretically, Americans should be extremely happy about their relations with India. Consider these three outcomes:

First, brain drain: America is able to lure the smartest engineers from India.

Second, huge market: America enjoys a virtual monopoly in key sectors - social media, e-commerce, financial technology and more - in the rapidly growing Indian economy, which is projected to surpass Japan and Germany by 2030.

Third, narrative control: The No.1 English TV channel in India is CNN, and almost all the influential think tanks in India are pro-US. Regarding China, the Washington consensus permeates the mainstream narrative in India.

However, it seems the US is still displeased.

This year witnessed India and the West becoming entangled in multiple disputes. Firstly, there was a BBC documentary that re-examined the 2002 Muslim-Hindu conflict in Gujarat, which occurred when Modi was the chief minister of the state. Then came a classic Western attack using separatists. Canada - a member of the Five Eyes - accused the Indian government of orchestrating the assassination of a Sikh separatist in Canada. This was followed by an indictment in the US, which alleges that an Indian government official conspired in a murder-for-hire plot targeting Sikh separatists in the US.

Note that true allies never worry about America harboring dissidents - say, French Canadian separatists or Basque separatists from Spain. Only when a country is targeted for destabilization would the US government discover violations of human rights and freedom. China understands these subversion tactics, thanks to what the US has done on the island of Taiwan and in Xizang, as well as Hong Kong and Xinjiang.

More revealingly, Western media have been crying crocodile tears about democracy in India since Modi came to power. Here are some sensational headlines:

"Modi's India is where global democracy dies" (New York Times)
"Modi's personality cult has replaced India's democracy" (Foreign Policy)
"India's authoritarian streak" (Foreign Affairs, a publication of the extremely powerful Council on Foreign Relations)"
'Electoral autocracy': The downgrading of India's democracy" (BBC)

It's very hard to please the US establishment, which demands total allegiance and submission from all its "allies."

First, India cherishes its friendship with Russia, a unique and strategic partner. India's refusal to ostracize Putin since the Ukraine war has irked the Biden administration, which foolishly hoped to devastate the Russian economy with sanctions.

Second, US corporate overlords have been extremely disappointed with India's progress in replacing China as the manufacturing powerhouse. Offshoring has been a very slow process, since India's manufacturing capability is 20 years behind China. For example, about 10 percent of iPhones are being assembled in India now, while many components are imported from China.

Finally, India's support for BRICS expansion and a multipolar world has made many Americans have doubts as to whether India is a reliable partner.

US elites are trapped in an echo chamber where they tell one another that America is the greatest country, its unipolar hegemony will last forever and China's collapse is imminent. Astoundingly, these people are unaware of the emerging multipolar world, the game-changing expansion of BRICS, the Global South's new paradigm of trade and development, the coming tsunami of de-dollarization, utter failures of US trade and tech wars against China, and Russia's victory against the US and NATO in Ukraine.

Given such a tragic state of affairs, it's very likely that the US will ratchet up the pressure on India, punishing it for its strategic autonomy. If the honeymoon turns into a nightmare, I hope India will seek rapprochement with China, a neighboring ancient civilization. Ironically, the US might end up as the Western empire that made significant contributions to the rise of the Asian century.

Read more here.

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