SCS Status Quo Reappears
Marcos Jr. cautious on SCS, SCS Security Review, US view on ASEAN SCS outlook
Marcos Jr. cautious on SCS
By Zhang Han (Global Times)
Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. picked his words carefully in his remarks concerning the South China Sea in his State of the Nation Address 2024 (SONA), a sign of willingness to de-escalate the tensions, some experts said.
Manila, while seeking to maximize its interests, does not want and cannot afford a confrontation at sea with China, and Marcos Jr. needs to calculate the political risks and losses in the 2025 midterm elections, as well as US reliability, analysts said on Tuesday.
Marcos Jr. said in his SONA on Monday that "We continuously try to find ways to de-escalate tensions in the contested areas without counterparts, without compromising our position and principles."
The remarks came after China and the Philippines reached a "provisional arrangement" on managing the situation at Ren'ai Jiao, or Ren'ai Reef, in the South China Sea. In the past few months, the Philippines has significantly escalated its provocation over resupply to an illegally grounded warship at China's reef.
Marcos Jr.'s SONA speech and the arrangement show that his administration does not want direct confrontation with China, as it runs contrary to its own interests, Xu Liping, director of the Center for Southeast Asian Studies at the Chinese Academy of Social Sciences, told the Global Times on Tuesday.
Both China and the Philippines hope the frictions in Ren'ai Jiao will not lead to broader tension in the South China Sea and are willing to make de-escalation efforts, Xu said.
But considering the Philippines' record of breaking a "gentleman's agreement," Ding Duo, a deputy director of the Institute of Maritime Law and Policy at China's National Institute for South China Sea Studies, said if the Philippines abuses China's flexibility and patience regarding the new arrangement as an expedient, and then goes back on its word, it will pay a heavier price for its repeated mistakes.
Chinese Foreign Ministry spokesperson Mao Ning on Tuesday reiterated the provisional arrangement was made based on the principled position of China.
"We take note that the Philippine side said it's ready to implement the arrangement it reached with China. We hope the Philippines will keep its word. We call on the Philippines to not to backpedal, not to create problems, and not to do anything that would complicate the situation.," Mao said at the routine press briefing.
Xu cited another two factors behind Marcos Jr.'s nuanced changes in tone and the realization of the arrangement.
With the 57th ASEAN Foreign Ministers' Meeting and related meetings to be held, a positive atmosphere is needed for negotiations on the South China Sea Code of Conduct, according to Xu.
Xu also mentioned the midterm elections in 2025. After Vice President Sara Duterte's resignation from cabinet posts, Marcos Jr. has to consider the risks of a collapse of their political alliance and its negative impact on the elections, Xu said.
Sincerely or not, the US said it "welcomed the diplomatic efforts" to de-escalate tensions in the South China Sea. US assistant secretary of state for East Asian and Pacific affairs Daniel Kritenbrink said as he announced that Secretary of State Antony Blinken would travel to the Philippines in a show of support, media reported. The US and the Philippines will have 2+2 dialogue between foreign and defense ministers in Manila on July 30.
Obviously, the US sees the Philippines as a convenient pivot for its "Indo-Pacific Strategy" in the South China Sea and also hopes to utilise the Southeast Asian country to intervene in the Taiwan question if necessary, analysts said.
Marcos Jr.'s administration is making deals with the US with an eye on upgrading its military equipment, more investment and strengthening its capability in the South China Sea, Xu said, but since the US has great uncertainty in its domestic politics, Manila should think carefully about how far the US' promises can be fulfilled.
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SCS Security Review
By Sophie Wushuang Yi (The Diplomat)
The strategic dynamics of the South China Sea in 2023 were marked by a complex interplay of diplomatic efforts, military posturing, regional cooperation, and legal disputes. Against this backdrop, China’s recent appointment of Admiral Dong Jun as the new defense minister has introduced a notable shift in leadership, posing potential implications for the ongoing China-U.S. strategic competition in the blue waters.
During a recent meeting in San Francisco in November, the leaders of China and the United States concurred on the resumption of high-level military communication, including the China-U.S. Defense Policy Coordination Talks and the China-U.S. Military Maritime Consultative Agreement meetings. They also agreed to facilitate telephone conversations between theater commanders.
A significant development occurred on December 21 when General Liu Zhenli, chief of the Joint Staff Department of the Central Military Commission (CMC), engaged in a video call with General Charles Brown, chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff of the U.S. military. The discussion encompassed the implementation of crucial military-related consensus from the San Francisco meeting and delved into various shared concerns. The video call resulted in positive and constructive outcomes. Beijing anticipated that Washington would collaborate in fostering the China-U.S. military-to-military relationship, adhering to principles of equality and respect. Specific exchange programs are currently under discussion between the defense authorities of both nations, a positive signal for 2024.
South China Sea Security Landscape: An Overview
2023 started out fairly promising in terms of the South China Sea. In January 2023, China and the Philippines engaged in diplomatic efforts, emphasizing the resolution of maritime issues through amicable negotiations.
The highlight was Philippine President Ferdinand Marcos Jr.’s visit to Beijing. Both nations expressed a commitment to peaceful dispute resolution in the ensuing joint statement. The establishment of direct communication mechanisms through the respective foreign ministries underscored a diplomatic channel to manage maritime concerns.
Yet quickly the warm dynamics were marred. In February 2023, the Philippines accused a China Coast Guard ship of using a military-grade laser against a Philippine Coast Guard vessel near the Second Thomas Shoal. Run-ins near the disputed shoal, which hosts a permanent Philippine troop presence aboard a ground naval vessel, would continue and escalate toward the end of 2023, with the latest incident in December involving water cannons and a collision.
Meanwhile, the United States continued to demonstrate a military presence in the South China Sea, conducting activities such as carrier deployments, joint exercises, and agreements with regional partners, including the Philippines. The U.S. reaffirmed its commitment to the region, addressing concerns related to the South China Sea and emphasizing its strategic interests. Multinational joint exercises, such as Cobra Gold 2023, reflected a shared focus on humanitarian assistance, disaster relief, and regional security.
Meanwhile, ASEAN member states engaged in discussions with China on implementing the “Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea” and negotiating a “Code of Conduct in the South China Sea.”
A significant legal development involved the Philippine Supreme Court declaring the maritime seismic agreement between the Philippines, China, and Vietnam unconstitutional and invalid. This ruling underscored the ongoing legal dimension in addressing territorial and maritime disputes.
Philippine Strategic Posture: A Multifaceted Approach
The Philippines strengthened military ties with the United States by continuing to expand implementation of the Enhanced Defense Cooperation Agreement, showcasing collaborative efforts in the defense domain. Additionally, Manila’s discussions with Australia indicated a willingness to seek support from multiple sources for regional affairs.
Proposed legislation in the Philippines aimed at establishing marine protected areas around the Kalayaan Islands and Scarborough Shoal demonstrated a commitment to preserving marine ecosystems and resources. Marcos emphasized the resolution of South China Sea issues through amicable negotiations. The prospect of a fisheries partnership with China suggested a cooperative approach to address maritime challenges.
Joint military exercises with the United States, such as the Balikatan exercise, showcased a heightened level of cooperation. The release of the Bilateral Defense Guidelines emphasized a joint commitment to the defense of the South China Sea.
The Philippines expressed intentions to conduct joint patrols in the South China Sea with countries including the United States, Japan, Australia, Canada, France, India, and Singapore. This plan aimed at reinforcing maritime security through collaborative efforts. The Philippines also enhanced its presence in the South China Sea by establishing a coast guard station on Thitu Island, reinforcing monitoring capabilities.
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US view on ASEAN SCS outlook
By Murray Hiebert, Gregory B. Poling, and Phuong Nguyen (CSIS)
The South China Sea disputes are long-standing. However, perhaps at no time have they posed as prominent an issue or as great a concern for China-Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) relations as they do today. Not only that, but the disputes are also the most complicated they have ever been. Long challenged by the number of actors and different kinds of claims involved with ASEAN itself tested by the different preferences of its members-managing these disputes are today additionally complicated by heightened domestic regime legitimacy concerns faced by key states, as well as the intersection of major power politics and the ongoing geopolitical negotiations between the United States and China.
ASEAN and Southeast Asia
For ASEAN states, the South China Sea brings together questions of both capability and intent. Although neither Chinese capability nor Chinese intent is as strong or as certain as sometimes portrayed by pundits and commentary, recent developments have done much to intensify Southeast Asian states' concerns about both. Provocative actions are not limited to China, but the power dynamics in China-ASEAN relations mean that Southeast Asian interests (economic and security related) may be more vulnerable in both the short term and the long term.
As regards the particular role that ASEAN itself might play, ASEAN states have the greatest stake in developing more effective mechanisms and responses to the South China Sea conflicts. The concern for ASEAN states is not just about whether or not ASEAN can manage tensions in an effective way; the concern is also the damage this issue has done to the reputation of the organization.
In particular, ASEAN, as an expression of the collective, has provided these smaller states a means by which to exercise voice and influence that they might not otherwise have had as individual states. However, ASEAN's unprecedented and very public and publicized failure to produce a joint communiqué at their regular foreign ministers' meeting in Phnom Penh in 2012 dramatically revealed the differences between ASEAN states, as much as between China and some ASEAN claimants. That failure now serves as a dramatic illustration of the difficulty faced by ASEAN as a collection of states trying to carve out a common approach.
As others have given much attention to the differences within ASEAN, there is no need to belabor them at length here. Suffice it to say that the intra-ASEAN fault lines are multiple and not always clear-cut. States differ in not just the importance attached to the disputes but also their relations with China and the kinds of regional responses prioritized. Clearly. such differences challenge any collective position. Since the 1980s, when states diverged in how best to respond to Vietnam's intervention into then Kampuchea, there has been an informal ASEAN rule that members will defer to the "frontline" state in any collective "ASEAN" response.
However, in the case of the South China Sea, ASEAN's four claimant states vary significantly in how they have chosen to approach the South China Sea disputes and manage the recent intensification of tensions. The Philippines' and Vietnam's positions and concerns may grab the headlines, but Malaysia and Brunei have been notably quiet thus far. The main point here is that until ASEAN's claimant states agree about how best to approach disputes, it will be difficult to talk about a common ASEAN position.
The emphasis placed on ASEAN as a mechanism for managing South China Sea tensions is itself relatively new. This is as much attributable to intra-ASEAN differences as to the institutional and ideological parameters of the organization.
A standard characterization of ASEAN as a security organization is that it focuses more on conflict management than conflict resolution. This is especially true if one equates conflict resolution with judicial settlement or third-party binding dispute settlement. Another common assumption is that the relative lack of binding dispute settlement is indicative of inaction. However, the focus on legal settlements can also obscure the activity taking place on the maritime boundaries front. It is just that the activity mostly takes the form of diplomatic, negotiated agreements over third-party dispute settlement. For example, since ASEAN's founding (technically, since 1969), states have concluded 39 maritime boundary arrangements, 29 of which were delimitation agreements and two of which were provisional agreements that involved some joint exercise of jurisdiction and management of resources.
Only one of those agreements involved third-party binding dispute settlement namely the dispute concerning Myanmar and Bangladesh over maritime boundaries in the Bay of Bengal. Other notable exceptions in a somewhat different category were states' decisions to submit their sovereignty disputes over Sipadan and Ligitan (Indonesia-Malaysia) and Pedra Branca (Malaysia-Singapore) to the International Court of Justice (ICJ).
In another respect, however, the focus on ASEAN as a source of conflict management may be somewhat misplaced or, at least, it is worth noting that the kind of role that ASEAN as an institution has been trying to play in the South China Sea is relatively new. For example, historically ASEAN has placed the greatest emphasis on preempting conflict or avoiding conflict that is, practicing self-restraint, establishing domestic developmental conditions conducive to stable status quo states rather than responding to conflict. In this vein, the responsibility has lain with individual states, not ASEAN as a collective or institutional body. Thus, in the bilateral cases of boundary management above, individual claimant states took the initiative, not ASEAN. In fact, it was understood during ASEAN's early years that bilateral disputes should remain bilateral lest they undermine what was then a fragile organization.
Thus, ASEAN's institutional role has tended to be indirect; that is, it provides an institutional setting supportive of national development, increased, continued political exchange between states, and regional integration, all of which is understood to encourage self-restraint. This is true for intra-ASEAN relations and conflicts, as well as conflicts between ASEAN states and others.
Of ASEAN documents, the Treaty of Amity and Cooperation (TAC) is most explicit in identifying an ASEAN role in managing interstate conflict. Signed in 1976, TAC was initially meant to offer a code of conduct for ASEAN states exclusively, but since 1986, other non-Southeast Asian states may also accede to the treaty.
Even in the case of TAC, however, ASEAN's role as a third party is severely constrained. For example, TAC's key mechanism is the High Council, but, ultimately, states' participation is voluntary. Over the years, many have cited states' preferences for other mechanisms (the High Council has never been invoked) as a sign of ASEAN weakness. However, it should be noted that in ASEAN, states turning to bilateral negotiations or to international bodies like the ICJ is not considered a sign of institutional weakness or the absence of ASEAN influence. Again, historically, the organization has seen its role as mostly indirect-that is, creating the conditions that will encourage states to manage their conflicts peacefully, be it by ASEAN or non-ASEAN means. In this sense, it plays the role of facilitator, not active mediator.
In this vein, the TAC (both the original and amended versions) also explicitly refers to the possibility of initiative from other states should disputing states find the High Council inappropriate. Here, some note the particularly responsive "managerial position" played by Indonesia in easing or facilitating political outcomes to key conflicts for example, its leadership in facilitating negotiations between Phnom Penh and Hanoi during the Cambodian conflict; its offer of good offices in Cambodia's and Thailand's recent dispute over Preah Vihear (which resulted in a stand-alone ASEAN foreign minister's statement on the issue, in addition to its inclusion in a statement issued by the chairman of the 19th ASEAN Summit); and, of course, most recently, its quick initiative in facilitating intra-ASEAN agreement over a set of common principles (the six basic principles on the South China Sea) following ASEAN's divisions at its 2012 ASEAN ministerial meeting.
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