We Are Water
Marcos Jr. Fishing Boat Farce, Xi Makes Time for Pacific Leaders - Biden Does Not, Why Cambodia’s Funan Techo Canal Project is Worrying Vietnam.
Marcos Jr. Fishing Boat Farce
By Zhou Fang (CGTN)
Before attending the trilateral summit in the United States, Marcos Jr. expressed his desire to obtain US$100 Billion in investment from the United States. The Biden administration has ignored the bold request.
The Philippines has been making waves over China’s Huangyan Island through self-staged farces. One recent farce was rallying a group of so-called fishermen in the waters off the island.
The country's coast guard ships and fishing vessels also frequently intrude into the waters near Huangyan Island to stage provocations.
China has repeatedly emphasised that “Huangyan Island is inherently Chinese territory and is beyond the limits of the Philippine territory.”
The Philippines has also been stirring up trouble by trespassing the waters adjacent to China's Ren'ai Jiao in the South China Sea multiple times.
Their goals were to transport materials to its military vessel that is illegally grounded on the uninhabited reef, an integral part of China's Nansha Qundao in the South China Sea.
The Philippine side made the moves while ignoring repeated dissuasion, warnings and route controls from the China Coast Guard.
All of the Philippines’ acts have violated the Declaration on the Conduct of Parties in the South China Sea and infringed on China's territorial sovereignty.
In the face of the Philippines’ provocative and arbitrary behaviors, the China Coast Guard implemented blocking and expulsion in accordance with laws and regulations.
Then what could explain such absurd behaviors from the Philippines?
The major reason is that the Marcos administration has become a pawn for certain countries led by the United States, willing to sacrifice the interests of their own people in exchange for perceived benefits and advantages.
Over the past several months, the Marcos administration has been seeking to please and cater to the strategies of other nations in confronting China. By doing so, President Ferdinand Marcos Jr. hopes to gain more public support and lay a foundation for future political achievements. At the same time, the Marcos administration also harbors the illusion that they can gain favor and so-called actual support by following the lead of the United States.
In turn, the U.S. seems to have understood this and has taken what appears to be “concrete actions” to express gratitude and sincerity.
On March 19th, during his visit to the Philippines, U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken reiterated the U.S. side’s defense commitment to the Philippines. Prior to this, U.S. Commerce Secretary Gina Raimondo had just paid a visit to the country.
On April 11, the United States, a former colonist of the Philippines, and Japan, a former invader of the country, held a summit in Washington together with the Philippines, discussing military cooperation, economic cooperation and the South China Sea issue.
The Philippines obviously has had a delusion that its relationship with the United States is already very close and that its own value has significantly increased. Therefore, before attending the summit in the United States, Marcos Jr. had expressed hope that it could obtain 100 billion U.S. dollars in investment from the United States. However, the Biden administration hasn’t yet responded to this bold request.
Will the U.S. fulfill the wishes of the Philippines this time, or will it once again provide a perfunctory response? Probably the latter. 100 billion U.S. dollars is a huge sum for any country, including the Unites States, considering that the country has a heavy burden to carry globally. The U.S. not only has to focus on its domestic infrastructure and economic development but also has been investing globally, including in the Asia-Pacific, the Middle East and Ukraine.
Will the United States’ defense commitment to the Philippines be rock solid? It’s likely that even the Philippines itself is not exactly sure or clear about the so-called commitment. The U.S. has been distorting China's policy on the South China Sea issue, claiming to "stand with the Filipino people," and reaffirming that Article IV of the "US-Philippines Mutual Defense Treaty" applies to the South China Sea. However, the two sides’ intentions and interpretations over the article might be different.
Most importantly, history tells us that the United States will never easily get involved in conflicts with other countries for the Philippines under any circumstances. This was best shown through the so-called South China Sea Arbitration in2016. After the ruling, faced with China's powerful and deterrent countermeasures, the aircraft carriers the U.S. had deployed in the South China Sea suddenly withdrew from the area, leaving everyone including the Philippines dumbfounded.
Therefore, the Philippines’ attempt to act aggressively in the South China Sea by courting other countries is undoubtedly absurd and even foolish.
Firstly, it’s regrettable to disrupt the hard-earned stable situation in the South China Sea. Advancing the negotiation of the "Code of Conduct in the South China Sea" has proven to be the correct way to maintain stability in the region.
Secondly, it brings the Philippines no good to lose China as an economic and trade partner. China has been the largest trading partner and import source of the Philippines. The economic and trade exchanges between the two sides are highly complementary, with cooperation frameworks such as the Belt and Road Initiative and the Regional Comprehensive Economic Partnership facilitating bilateral economic and trade cooperation.
History has repeatedly proven that when it comes to issues of territorial sovereignty, China has never compromised. And the country is always willing to strive for cooperation and mutual benefit, even if there are disagreements with its partners.
The Philippines’ attempt to challenge the bottom line and red line of peace and stability in the South China Sea by aligning with other countries is destined to be a self-inflicted farce that harms itself and makes itself a laughingstock.
NB: Zhou Fang is a CGTN reporter based in Beijing, China.
Xi Makes Time for Pacific Leaders, Biden Does Not
By Camilla Pohle
If the U.S. government wants an edge over China in the Pacific Islands, it needs to facilitate more meetings between the president of the United States and regional leaders, preferably one-on-one. When Pacific Island leaders fly to Beijing, they often have a one-on-one meeting with Chinese President Xi Jinping, but such a meeting between the leader of a Pacific Island country and a sitting president of the United States has never taken place. The White House has only conducted joint meetings with Pacific Island leaders. Sometimes even joint meetings don’t make the cut.
In March, the U.S. Congress approved 20-year funding renewals for the Compacts of Free Association, bilateral agreements between the United States and Palau, the Federated States of Micronesia and the Marshall Islands. These three countries, known as the Freely Associated States, are seen as Washington’s most important partners in the Pacific Islands because of the far-reaching nature of the agreements, which permit U.S. military access to a vast and strategic region. But there are serious rifts in these relationships that need to be repaired.
White House talking points have emphasized the importance of the Freely Associated States, and the Pacific Islands more broadly, beyond their strategic value. But actions often matter more than words. Unfortunately, the Freely Associated States often perceive that they are a low priority for the United States when it’s not about advancing U.S. strategic interests.
This month, Palauan President Surangel Whipps Jr. and Marshall Islands President Hilda Heine were scheduled to visit Washington for a signing ceremony for the Compacts of Free Association. However, they cancelled their travel, most likely because they learned that they would not be able to meet with President Joe Biden. This added insult to injury after the Freely Associated States had endured a six-month delay of crucial U.S. funding. In April, Federated States of Micronesia President Wesley Simina visited Washington for a signing ceremony, but did not get a meeting with Biden, instead meeting with Secretary of Defense Lloyd Austin and Deputy Secretary of State Kurt Campbell.
When Pacific Island leaders are unable to meet with the U.S. president, it sends a message that the United States does not value or prioritize them, and makes the relationships appear distant and transactional. No amount of positive messaging can change this reality.
The Freely Associated States Need U.S. Attention
The Federated States of Micronesia receives different treatment from the Chinese government. Last month, Simina flew to Beijing, where he was photographed shaking hands with Xi, and the two leaders signed 10 memorandums of understanding. The fact that Xi could make time to meet Simina was a show of respect and a sign that China values the bilateral relationship. Palau and the Marshall Islands recognize Taiwan, but if they were to switch, their leaders would receive the red-carpet treatment in China, too.
The costs of U.S. inattention could be high. The United States should not assume that the Compacts of Free Association are a bulwark against Chinese influence: Beijing has been able to make many inroads there regardless of the presence of these agreements. Just in the last few years, Chinese activity in the Freely Associated States has ranged from espionage to organized crime to bribing government leaders to pressuring Palau and the Marshall Islands to switch recognition.
The United States should not expect China’s pressure to let up. In April, Whipps said that Beijing’s attempts to win over the Palauan government are “constant,” including offers to build hotels and other infrastructure projects and to increase Chinese tourism to bolster Palau’s economy. In return, Beijing expects Palau to sever its relations with Taipei. Whipps opposes this. Nevertheless, he will be up for reelection in November, and China’s pressure on Palau is likely to increase during the election.
The Freely Associated States are becoming increasingly important to U.S. defense posture in the Pacific, with a greater Department of Defense presence planned in Palauand the Federated States of Micronesia. Meanwhile, the Marshall Islands hosts a U.S. missile defense test range on Kwajalein Atoll. The costs, therefore, of prolonged political tensions between Washington and the Freely Associated States are detrimental to U.S. interests. In early March, due to the funding delay, Heine questioned whether the United States and the Marshall Islands had come to the “crossroads” in their relationship. In December, Palau’s Senate wrote a resolution rejecting a potential U.S. missile deployment to Palau.
If there were no tensions between Washington and the Freely Associated States, the snub of not receiving a meeting with Biden wouldn’t matter as much. But there are tensions, ranging from frustrations over delayed U.S. funding, to concerns that the islands could become targets for China in a future conflict, to the legacy of U.S. nuclear testing in the Marshall Islands, to a general perception — borne out by recent events — that U.S. leadership just isn’t that interested in the islands beyond their strategic value.
Missed U.S. Opportunities
Because of the United States’ special relationships with the Freely Associated States under the Compacts of Free Association, it is particularly urgent for Biden to meet with their leaders. But more careful U.S. attention toward the rest of the Pacific Islands is also needed.
China outstrips the United States in presidential visits to the region. Xi traveled to Papua New Guinea in 2018 and Fiji in 2014. In contrast, no sitting U.S. president has ever visited a Pacific Island country. Biden cancelled a planned trip to Papua New Guinea in 2023, causing much disappointment there and across the region, since multiple Pacific Island leaders had made plans to be in Port Moresby to meet him. While it is difficult to quantitatively measure the impact of the cancellation on the success of the United States’ Pacific Islands strategy, it undoubtedly caused setbacks for Washington, both by snubbing Papua New Guinea and undermining confidence in U.S. commitment to the region.
China outstrips the United States by an even larger margin in sheer number of meetings at the presidential and prime ministerial level. The White House held U.S.-Pacific Islands summits in 2022 and 2023 in which Biden met with regional leaders in a group. Xi has also held some joint meetings with Pacific Island leaders, but often meets them one-on-one. In addition to meeting with multiple presidents of the Federated States of Micronesia, Xi has met with Papua New Guinea Prime Minister James Marape and his predecessor Peter O’Neill, Fijian Prime Minister Sitiveni Rabukaand his predecessor Frank Bainimarama, former Solomon Islands Prime Minister Manasseh Sogavare, successive prime ministers of Vanuatu, Kiribati President Taneti Maamaau and other regional leaders. He has met with many of these leaders multiple times.
High-level diplomacy is more crucial than ever as the United States seeks to shore up its influence in the Pacific Islands. Regional leaders can expect that when they visit Beijing, they will be able to meet and shake hands with Xi, and they may even have additional time to discuss joint cooperation. They can’t expect similar treatment on a visit to Washington. If the U.S. government wants to have strong relationships with Pacific Island leaders, it needs to work to reverse this dynamic.
In the absence of one-on-one meetings with the U.S. president, and in the aftermath of Biden’s cancelled trip to Papua New Guinea, presidential rhetoric also matters more than ever. In April, Biden suggested that his uncle had been eaten by cannibals in Papua New Guinea during World War II, to which Marape responded that Papua New Guineans didn’t deserve to be labelled as cannibals and urged the United States to address World War II unexploded ordnance. Papua New Guinea’s foreign minister, Justin Tkachenko, said that relations with Washington had hit a “low point” due to Biden’s comments.
As the United States competes with China for influence in the Pacific, winning that competition requires forging strong and enduring relationships. This is why rhetoric and high-level meetings and visits matter more than ever. It’s easier said than done to make time on the White House schedule, but this is precisely why a meeting with the U.S. president holds such great symbolism, particularly in a region long ignored by the United States.
Read more here.
Why Cambodia’s Funan Techo Canal Project is Worrying Vietnam
By Vietnam Briefing Dezan Shira & Associates
Despite the positive outcomes predicted by the Cambodian government, the Funan Techo Canal project that will establish a waterway linking Phnom Penh to its coastal province Kep, has prompted socioeconomic, political, and environmental concerns from Vietnam, which stands to be the country that will be affected most by the project.
On April 2, 2024, Deputy Prime Minister, and First Vice-Chairman of the Council for the Development of Cambodia (CDC), Sun Chantol, unveiled plans to commence construction work on the Cambodian Funan Techo Canal project this year.
Positioned as the cornerstone of Cambodia’s bid to emerge as a pivotal logistic and economic hub within Southeast Asia, the Funan Techo Canal stands as the region’s most recent large-scale infrastructure project. This project aims to link different areas of Cambodia, promising a surge in economic opportunities by enhancing connectivity and facilitating the seamless movement of goods and people across the country.
While the Funan Techo Canal holds promises for catalyzing economic growth, it has sparked notable apprehensions among local communities and neighboring countries, especially Vietnam.
Below we get into the available information on the Funan Techo Canal project while looking into its transformative potential and shedding light on key concerns regarding the project’s outcomes.
What is the Funan Techo Canal project?
The ambitious Funan Techo Canal project marks a significant stride in Cambodia’s infrastructural evolution, proposing to dig a 180-kilometer canal connecting Phnom Penh Autonomous Port to the coastal province of Kep, ultimately opening onto the South China Sea. Once completed, the canal will stand as the Kingdom of Cambodia’s first capital-to-coastal waterway stretching through key regions, such as Kadal, Takeo, and Kampot.
According to the project’s blueprint, the Funan Techo Canal is expected to be 100 meters wide upstream and 80 meters downstream with a total depth of 5.4 meters. This design consideration, coupled with the provision of two shipping lanes, ensures the seamless passage of vessels of up to 3,000 deadweight tonnages in opposite directions simultaneously.
Furthermore, its infrastructure plan includes the construction of three waterway dams, eleven bridges, and 208-kilometer sidewalks, ensuring safe navigation and seamless connectivity.
With a predicted cost of US$1.7 billion, the Funan Techo Canal has a targeted completion date earmarked for 2028.
Project objectives
The Funan Techo Canal presents a multifaced set of objectives, poised to reshape and develop Cambodia’s economic landscape while also addressing challenges in various sectors. Key objectives include:
Enhancing connectivity and economic expansion: Central to the Funan Techo Canal’s objective is the linkage of disparate regions of Cambodia while promoting economic growth. By establishing a navigable water route from Phnom Penh’s port to Kep province, the canal will create more affordable access to both domestic and international markets. This will facilitate seamless import and export of goods, spurring trade and commerce. Furthermore, the project is also expected to create employment opportunities for the 5 million residents along its route without burdening the nation’s external debt.
Strengthening infrastructure and transportation: The necessity of the canal for significant investment in infrastructure, such as roads, bridges, and waterways, will propel a noteworthy overall improvement of the nation’s transportation system. These developments will contribute to the enhancement of overall transportation networks, thereby improving access to isolated areas, and fostering regional integration and economic growth.
Promoting environmental sustainability: The Funan Techo Canal is not only envisioned as a driver of Cambodia’s economic expansion but also as a catalyst for environmental sustainability. Its capacity to alter water courses is, in fact, anticipated to revolutionize water resource management, thereby driving the development of the Kingdom’s agricultural sector, and enhancing flood mitigation and water conservation efforts. Furthermore, the Funan Techo Canal project also aims to create a healthy environment, opening up a wide plethora of opportunities for the promotion of ecotourism in the area.
Attracting foreign investment: The project is also part of Cambodia’s growing effort to attract foreign direct investments (FDI). By establishing improved connectivity with both domestic and global markets, the Funan Techo Canal is anticipated to enhance the country’s attractiveness as an investment destination.
China’s involvement in the project
Following a meeting in September 2023, China’s China Bridge and Road Cooperation (CBRC) signed an agreement with Cambodia to finance the construction of the canal. Shouldering the entire US$1.7 billion financial burden needed for the realization of the project, CBRC established itself as the major stakeholder of the Funan Techo Canal.
The rationale behind China’s significant investment in the project can be justified by multiple factors:
Economic return: According to the contract stipulated, China’s status as a major stakeholder in the project confers upon it exclusive managerial authority over the canal for a duration spanning 40 to 50 years. During this period, China retains full control over operational aspects, including toll collection – drivers are expected to pay between US$12 for a small car and up to US$60 for a cargo truck one-way travel on the expressway. Only upon the lapse of the 50 years, the management of the canal will be transferred to Cambodia.
Belt and Road Initiative (BRI): In the broader framework of China’s BRI, the Funan Techo Canal plays a key role in enhancing regional connectivity and catalyzing China’s pursuit of high-quality development. The canal will propel the full execution of the Industrial Development and the Rice and Fish Corridors.
Enhanced influence in the region: China’s investment in the area aligns with the country’s overarching ambition of bolstering economic, diplomatic, and geopolitical ties with Phnom Penh. The substantial investment deepens Cambodia’s economic interdependency with Beijing, thereby amplifying China’s influence in the region. By positioning itself as a key economic partner of Cambodia, China is poised to exert greater influence also in shaping dynamics in Southeast Asia.
Key areas of concern
Despite the positive outcomes predicted by the Cambodian government, the Funan Techo Canal project has prompted a wide spectrum of concerns, particularly from Vietnam, which stands to be the country that will be affected most by the project.
Socio-environmental impact
Vietnam’s initial apprehension primarily centers around the potential environmental impact that the Funan Techo Canal might have on the Mekong region.
Of particular concern is the projected alteration of water flow within the Mekong River. Studies conducted by the US-based Stimson Center’s Southeast Asia Program suggest that the canal’s construction, as envisaged, may act as a levee, preventing water from reaching crucial areas of the Mekong Delta in Southern Vietnam. In essence, the canal could act like a dam, consequently resulting in the creation of a dry zone south of the canal and wet zones to its north.
Such an alteration of the water stream would also significantly impact agricultural activities and endanger the habitat of vulnerable species in the area.
Furthermore, Cambodian local communities have also voiced their concerns regarding the project. The anticipated realization of the Funan Techo Canal would require the displacement of an unspecified number of communities out of the 1.5 million Cambodians currently residing along its proposed route. This would result in considerable disruption and discomfort for these communities and their local activities.
Economic impact
Another area of concern is the economic impact that the new canal would have on Vietnam.
Currently, Cambodia heavily relies on Vietnamese strategic ports, located along the Mekong Delta’s mouth, for importing raw materials from China and exporting finished products to the US and Western markets. Since 2011, around 30 million tons of goods have been transported across Vietnam-Cambodia waterway routes.
The construction of the Funan Techo Canal would potentially disrupt this reliance, as Cambodia would increasingly depend on its own waterway transportation. This shift would directly impact Vietnam’s shipping earnings from Cambodian trade.
By providing an alternative route for Cambodian import and export activities, linking Phnom Penh’s port to a would-be deepwater port in Kep province on the Gulf of Thailand, the canal threatens the profitability of Vietnam’s Cai Map and other ports near Ho Chi Minh City, which until now have served as a primary gateway to the South China Sea.
South China Sea dispute
One final pressing concern surrounding the Funan Techo Canal project pertains to China’s significant involvement and its potential impact on the ongoing South China Sea dispute.
Cambodia’s deepened economic reliance on Beijing is particularly worrisome. The latter not only suggests a decreasing influence of Vietnam in the area, but it also raises concern for a possible transition into political sway, leading to Cambodian unwavering support for China in regional and international affairs.
This heightened dependency underscores concerns regarding the project’s possible “dual use” nature, wherein alongside promoting socio-economic development, canal facilities could serve as a platform for intensifying Chinese military presence within Cambodian territory.
Of significant concern is the canal’s depth capacity to accommodate military vessels entering from the Gulf of Thailand and approaching the Cambodian-Vietnam border. This represents a strategic concern for Vietnam, as it could potentially shift the balance in China’s favor in the context of the South China Sea dispute. Vietnam, grappling with the most extensive overlapping territorial claims with China in the region, faces the prospect of increased Chinese assertiveness and influence, further complicating an already tense geopolitical landscape.
Outlook
The Funan Techo Canal project embodies Cambodia’s aspiration for economic growth and affirmation as a powerhouse in Southeast Asia. However, in reaching the envisioned objectives, there are socioeconomic and political challenges that should not be underestimated.
Read more here.